A few years ago, I wrote an article titled: The Cruelty Behind the Truman Doctrine. I’d like to revisit this Doctrine.

The Truman Doctrine was an American foreign policy whose stated purpose was to counter Soviet geopolitical expansion during the Cold War. It was announced to Congress by President Harry S. Truman on March 12, 1947, and further developed on July 4, 1948, when he pledged to contain threats in Greece and Turkey.

In the middle of his speech, Truman says:

“It is necessary only to glance at a map to realize that the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.”

Now, a CIA study published in February 1948 explained Truman’s statement in the language of realpolitik:

“From the economic point of view, the most serious consequence of the fall of Greece would be the possible loss of the petroleum resources of the Middle East (comprising 40 percent of proven world reserves) through political repercussions in Iran and the Arab States. … Denial of this oil to the Western Powers, however, would have drastic effect on both their strategic capabilities in the region and the economy of Western Europe. … This increased drain on the oil reserves of the Western Hemisphere, if long continued, could make the US liquid-fuel position precarious in the event of war. Eventual loss of the petroleum resources of Saudi Arabia, Bahrein, and Kuwait would put in question the adequacy of the resources remaining to the Western Powers to meet their future need, even in time of peace.

With respect to other commodities, the USSR would gain no great benefit, nor would the US and Western Europe suffer any great loss, from the Soviet control of Greece, Italy, or Iran. None of the foodstuff or metallic ores exported from those countries is of strategic significance to the US or Western Europe. In fact, Greece and Italy are liabilities in terms of food supply, fertilizers, and chemicals: the elimination of those countries from consideration would permit increased supply to others.”

Here’s what it says about the Arab States:

“Fearing the USSR and lacking confidence in the power of Great Britain to protect them, the Arab Governments would call on the United States for economic assistance and military guarantees. If this call went unanswered, US influence in the Arab world, would already severely damaged by US support of Zionism, would be destroyed by loss of confidence in US capabilities and intentions. The Arabs would not turn to the USSR as an alternative to the US. Lacking any reliable outside support, they would turn inward, with a consequent intensification of nationalism, Pan-Arabism, and xenophobia. All restraint on the Arab reaction to the situation in Palestine would disappear: a full-scale holy war to expel European Jewish intruders from the country could readily develop. Attacks on US national and property would increase: although oil installations in Saudi Arabia might be relatively secure for the time being, the operation of pipe lines to the Mediterranean would become impossible.”

“Although the initial Arab reaction, indicated above, would be unifying in effect, the isolation of the Arab States would be in the long term favor the recrudescence of latent disruptive forces such as ethnic separatism (e.g., of the Kurds, Assyrians, Druzes), dynastic rivalries (as between the Hashimites and Ibn Saud), and ancient tribal feuds. The USSR would be active in exciting and exploiting these disruptive tendencies, and in stirring up mass discontent with the existing economic and political order in the Arab States. Eventually Arab Governments might find themselves facing a choice between coming to terms with the USSR or being overthrown and replaced by governments subservient to the Soviet Onion. This situation could arise most readily in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt. Saudi Arabia will prove relatively stable during the lifetime of Ibn Saud, but on his death will tend to break up, with consequent jeopardy to US oil interests there in the circumstances envisaged.”

Italy:

Continued reliance on US support would be the only course open to the De Gasperi Government. It would clamor for greatly increased economic aid and for military guarantees. The disillusionment of the Italian people would be such, however, that, without convincing evidence of a new US determination to defend Italy on such a scale as to guarantee that country against becoming a battleground, De Gasperi’s popular support would tend to disintegrate. The Communists, as the only practical alternative to De Gasperi in the circumstances, would correspondingly gain strength. If a free election were to be held, this popular reaction would probably carry the Communists to power by political processes. If not, the demoralization of their opponents would probably permit the Communists to seize power by force. On way or the other, the fall of Greece to international Communism would probably be followed within a few months by the fall of Italy.

It’s always about the oil and the Communists! 🙂

Did you notice the dangers of “free elections” that might bring the wrong party into power?

Thanks for reading,

Notes:

CIA – Possible Consequences of Communist Control of Greece in the Absence of US Counteraction

Truman’s full speech: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp