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The Atlantic Charter, Propaganda, and the True Aims of the Post-War Period

The “Grand Area” was a concept created by the Council of Foreign Relations (CFR) and the U.S. State Department in the early 1940s. During WWII, it was assumed that the U.S. would emerge from the war as the world’s dominant power. One of the primary war aims was to organize a “Grand Area” to serve the needs of the American economy.

But there was a small problem: the American people had to be inspired and mobilized to enter the war and win it.

The leaders of this country recommended that this problem was easily solved with the use of sophisticated propaganda. The CFR’s War and Peace Studies groups pointed out in July 1941 that “formulation of a statement of war aims for propaganda purposes is very different from formulation of one defining the true national interest.” [1]

In April 1941, the CFR suggested to the government that a statement of American war aims should be prepared as such:

If war aims are stated which seem to be concerned solely with Anglo-American imperialism, they will offer little to people in the rest of the world, and will be vulnerable to Nazi counterpromises. Such aims would also strengthen the most reactionary elements in the United States and the British Empire. The interests of other peoples should be stressed, not only those of Europe, but also of Asia, Africa and Latin America. This would have a better propaganda effect. [2]

So what did the American government write? In August of 1941, the Roosevelt administration released the famous Atlantic Charter. This charter defined the goals of the post-war period. It was the public war aims statement of the United States, and its reason for being was propaganda. The generalized aims it advocated were those which people everywhere would agree were laudable: freedom, equality, prosperity, and peace.

However, the internal record shows a very different vision of the post-war period. On December 15, 1941, Isaiah Bowman, CFR vice-president from 1945-1949, wrote to Hamilton Fish Armstrong, vice-chairman of the CFR War and Peace Studies, that the Council and the American government now had to

think of world-organization in a fresh way. To the degree that the United States is the arsenal of the Democracies it will be the final arsenal at the moment of victory. It cannot throw the contents of that arsenal away. It must accept world responsibility. . . . The measure of our victory will be the measure of our domination after victory. [3]

The next month, in January 16, 1942, Bowman further asserted that at minimum, an enlarged conception of American security interests would be necessary after the war in order to deal with areas “strategically necessary for world control”. [4]

Any questions?

Thanks for reading,

Notes:

For an in depth look at the internal records of post-WWII planning by the U.S. State Department and the CFR, please read Imperial Brain Trust – The Council on Foreign Relations & United States Foreign Policy.

  1. Memorandom E-A18, July 19, 1941, CFR, Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace, Yale University Library, New Haven, Connecticut
  2. Memorandom E-B32, April 17, 1941, CFR, Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace, Northwestern University Library, Evanston, Illinois
  3. Bowman to Armstrong, December 15, 1941, Bowman Papers, Armstrong File, John Hopkins University Library, Baltimore, Maryland
  4. Memorandom T-A21, January 16, 1942, CFR, Studies of American Interests in the War and the Peace, Baldwin Papers, Yale University Library, New Haven, Connecticut

President Roosevelt had hoped that the Charter might encourage the American people to back U.S. intervention in World War II on behalf of the Allies; however, public opinion remained adamantly opposed to such a policy until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.

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3 responses to “The Atlantic Charter, Propaganda, and the True Aims of the Post-War Period”

  1. Ho Chi Minh Falls for U.S. Propaganda – Elpidio Valdes

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    Reply
  2. Nick Santoro Avatar
    Nick Santoro

    I’m trying to understand how soon after the June 1940 defeat of France were discussions started between the British and Americans before the August 1941 Atlantic Charter?

    Re above quote: “On December 15, 1941, Isaiah Bowman, CFR vice-president from 1945-1949, wrote to Hamilton Fish Armstrong, vice-chairman of the CFR War and Peace Studies, that the Council and the American government now had to think of world-organization in a fresh way. To the degree that the United States is the arsenal of the Democracies it will be the final arsenal at the moment of victory. It cannot throw the contents of that arsenal away. It must accept world responsibility. . . . The measure of our victory will be the measure of our domination after victory. [3]”

    Are you able to tell me if the Joint Declaration of the President and Prime Minister and Atlantic Charter are the same? And do these “unofficial” policies still underly American international policies and military deployments?

    Thank you,

    Nick Santoro

    Reply
    1. elpidiovaldes Avatar
      elpidiovaldes

      Hi. Yes, the Joint Declaration and the Atlantic Charter are the same. There is no formal legal document called the “Atlantic Charter”. Instead, it was simply known as the Joint Declaration.

      As for the meetings between the Americans and the English, Churchill and Roosevelt began communicating in 1939, the first of their 11 meetings during the war period.

      You should read the first 3 parts of the declassified Pentagon Papers where the real strategic interests are discussed internally:

      U.S. Policy, 1940-1950: Summary: “Ultimately, U.S. policy was governed neither by the principles of the Atlantic Charter, nor by the President’s anti-colonialism, but by the dictates of military strategy, and by British intransigence on the colonial issue. … Despite his lip service to the trusteeship and anti-colonialism, F.D.R. in fact assigned to Indochina a status correlative to Burma, Malaya, Singapore and Indonesia: free territory to be reconquered and returned to its former owners”

      U.S. State Department Memo, 6th August 1940: “Make clear the fact that the occupation of Indochina by Japan possibly means one further important step to seizing control of the South Sea area, including trade routes of supreme importance to the United States controlling such products as rubber, tin and other commodities. This was of vital concern to the United States”

      U.S. State Department Press Statement, 2nd August 1941: “This Government, mindful of its traditional friendship for France, has deeply sympathized with the desire of the French people to maintain their territories and to preserve them in tact”.

      So yes! All the internal meetings, declassified documents, memos and letters clearly demonstrate that the Atlantic Charter is nothing more than official state propaganda.

      Finally, your question: “do these ‘unofficial’ policies still underly American international policies and military deployments?” The answer is clearly yes. Case and point: The Middle East. When asked about the murder and dismemberment of Washington Post Columnist, Khashoggi, by the Saudi government, the President of this great nation simply responded with: “but look at the cool military equipment the Saudis buy from us. We couldn’t possibly let something as silly as state murder get in the way of out interests!” (paraphrased)

      Hope that helped 🙂

      Reply

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