Occasionally, public officials reveal to the world the truth regarding U.S. foreign policy. This is a statement by Frank M. Coffin, Deputy Administrator, Agency for International Development (AID), outlining the objectives of the AID program.

I. Objectives of the Aid Program

Our basic, broadest goal is a long-range political one. It it not development for the sake of sheer development. As the Foreign Assistance Act (sec. 102) states, our policies and program should assist other countries to “… help them maintain their freedom … [and] be directed toward the social as well as economic aspects of economic development…”

President John stated it succinctly in the state of the Union message: “… We must strengthen the ability of free nations everywhere to develop their independence and raise their standards of living and thereby frustrate those who prey on poverty and chaos.”

By the same token we defeat this long-range purpose if our development assistance appears to be a short-range, tactical vehicle for imposing a catechism of specific doctrines and dogma on other countries.

I would like to quote a statement from a member of our staff who put on paper his thoughts about our technical assistance efforts.

This is what he said: “The foreign assistance program is ideological, profoundly so. If technical assistance as tendered by the Russians or the Chinese is no different than the technical assistance the West provides, then the West has failed miserably. There ought to be a glaring, immediately apparent, difference between the aid programs of the West and those of world communism. The one seeks partnership; the other seeks domination. The one is genuinely concerned with the welfare of the developing countries; the other pretends a concern but, in reality, invests every action with a propaganda component. The one extends the helping hand of cooperation; the other extends the strong arm which seeks manipulation of the destiny of others.”

There is a very substantial ideological content in the AID program, but its effectiveness depends upon its being clearly related to the pursuit of the mutual objectives that the air program is directly supporting. Our influence, which can be considerable, depends much more on that we do and how we do it than on what we tell the people with whom we deal. this is true at every level from the nation to the individual activity. When we support generously a country which is bending its best efforts to oppose outside domination, mobilize its people for greater productivity, overcome archaic and repressive institutions, and provide higher living standards, education, freedom, and justice for its people, we advance these ideas. When within a county we provide strong support to a development bank which provides resources for accelerated private industrial investment, to a program for expanding cooperatives serving small farmers, or to a training institution for free labor leadership we have a powerful impact on ideological trends. By and large we are best promoting U.S. ideological objectives when we are by the government and people of the country in which we are operating to be doing a good job in supporting their security and development efforts.

It is also our object to promote and support specifically the will and ability to defend against aggression and subversion where these threaten, since we recognize that these remain major threats to growth, freedom, and stability. Security against subjugation from within our without remains an indispensable precondition to the effective carrying out of programs to develop freedom and justice. Unhappily, active and potential aggressive threats, especially from China and Cuba at present, still require defensive measures by a large number of important countries which they can ill afford. Our military assistance program and a considerable portion of out economic aid is needed to enable them to meet these dangers successfully without undermining their political and economic stability.

An important objective is to open the the maximum opportunity for domestic private initiative and enterprise and to insure that foreign private investment, particularly from the United States, is welcomed and well treated.

We have special interests, of course, in doing what we can do to insure that success of the effort of those countries which are closely tied to us by treaty and traditional relations. We have an interest in blunting and combating the aggressive designs of members of the Communist world, particularly of those like Cuba and China which are actively engaged in or threatening aggressive or subversive action against free countries. As President Johnson said, “… we do not intend to be buried.”

There are a host of other U.S. objectives, many of them reflected in the aid legislation, which have an ideological content. Some of these are: freedom of press and religion; nondiscrimination on the basis of race, religion, or color; emphasis on help to small business, individual enterprises, small farmers, cooperatives, cottage industries, and community development; emphasis on programs to stimulate and facilitate private home ownership; accelerated negotiation of and compliance with tax, commerce, and trade treaties encouraging and protecting private investment; protection of private investment against expropriation without fair and prompt compensation; freedom of navigation.

This list if sufficient to suggest that the U.S. objectives which must be taken into account in framing that aid program are many and complex. The list is not complete; in a sense all U.S. objectives must be considered to the extent that the aid program has any relevance to them. The program is to weigh the relative importance of the relevant objectives in particular cases and to evaluate the manner in which the program can make the greatest contribution to the totality of U.S. interests.

The question often arises whether the primary objective of the program is anti-Communist or whether it is primary designed to support economic development. The answer is, of course, that it is both. In the world as it is today the distinction is not a real one. Despite its tactical moves, communism today remains an aggressive force dedicated to subjugation of the independence of all nations by force, subversion, or persuasion. The dominant mission of the aid program is to assist the efforts of the less developed countries to become stronger, more stable, and more successful in defending their freedom. Success is these efforts is the most important necessary condition to preventing the spread of communism. The growth of strong independent countries which are successfully meeting the material, political, and social needs and demands of their people contribute in many other ways to U.S. interests, and the programs to support such growth can often serve directly other U.S. interests. But in considering other objectives we should never lose sight of the paramount importance of succeeding in this primary purpose.

II. Policy Planning and Coordination

A. General Program Policy

1. General — Coordination between AID and the State Department is effected on a day-to-day basis both in the field and Washington. In the field, the major mechanism of coordination is the country team. In Washington, coordination between regional bureaus and staff offices of State and AID is a close and continuing process. The AID administrator attends the daily staff meetings of the Secretary of State. Other senior officials attend larger staff meetings chaired by the Secretary 3 days a week. There are close and continuing relationships at all levels between State and AID officials.

AID’s Administrator reports directly to the Secretary of State and to the President. Although he never reports tot he President without informing the Secretary of State, he often deals directly with the White House and on some matters reports directly to the President.

The AID administrator, though, not a member of the National Security Council, attends its meetings whenever they pertain to AID. He is a member of an interdepartmental group which considers problems related to national security prior to discussion in the Council and to decision by the President.

The Agency has a close and frequent relationships with the U.S. Information Agency, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, as well as other agencies on matters relating to their special fields of interest.

2. Program Planning — The AID program planning process recognizes that the program is an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. AID country programs, including the technical assistance program, are developed in the field on the basis of the program guidance and instructions from Washington. They are reviewed and approved in Washington and negotiated with the government of the country concerned.

…

III. AID Programs and Policy Implementation

D. Private Enterprise

The fostering of a vigorous and expanding private sector in the less developed countries is one of our most important responsibilities. Both domestic private initiative and management and outside investment are important. From a purely economic standpoint private enterprise can mobilize domestic resources and achieve levels of efficiency that are often well beyond what the Government can attain. Foreign companies bring not only needed foreign exchange but technical and organizational competence, knowledge of foreign markets, and access to other services and connections that may be even more important, particularly in export promotion and new industries. Politically, a strong and progressive private business community provides a powerful force for stable, responsible Government and a built-in check against Communist dogma.

…

And so on.

Thanks for reading,

Notes,

Winning the Cold War: The U. S. Ideological Offensive, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 88th Congress, second session, Part VIII, U.S. Government Agencies and Programs, January 15 and 16, 1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), 953f.

https://books.google.com/books?id=uA4TcVbQIlwC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false