The reasons for US-lead terrorist attacks against Cuba and the illegal economic embargo are spelled out in internal US records. International terrorism and economic warfare are justified not by what Cuba does, but by its “very existence,” its “successful defiance” of the proper master of the hemisphere.

Here are some internal records:

October 23, 1959, Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Rubottom) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy), Current Basic United States Policy Towards Cuba:

“Castro’s economic policies, apart from directly affecting adversely the rights of United States investors in Cuba and thus raising additional problems in U.S.-Cuban relations, have a distinctly statist and nationalist orientation which, if also adopted by other Latin American countries, would seriously undermine our economic policies and objectives with respect to the Latin American region.

At the same time, the policy statement is based on an assessment that Castro retains a great popular following in Cuba having tapped and crystallized the more humble Cuban’s aspirations for economic betterment, democratic freedom, and national dignity. Although there has been much disillusionment concerning Castro and his regime elsewhere in Latin America, there remains in certain circles a residual admiration for what he has achieved and sought to achieve, including his posture of defiance of the United States. In these circumstances, and from the great sensitivity of Latin America to United States intervention or open United States pressure, it is of the first importance that we avoid bringing upon ourselves the onus for a forced alteration of Castro’s policies or a change in the Cuban Government.

The statement is also based on the assessment that with unstable internal conditions likely to continue in a number of Caribbean countries for the next several years, there is a continuing danger that other regimes responsive to and/or modeled on the Castro regime may arise elsewhere in the region with serious adverse consequences to our security and interests.“

January 14, 1960, Memorandum of Discussion at the 432d Meeting of the National Security Council:

“The Vice President believed we should look at Latin America as a single area from an investment point of view, so that anything which hurts investment in one part of Latin American hurts investment throughout the area.“

March 22, 1960, Special National Intelligence Estimate, Communist Influence in Cuba:

“The Communists probably also believe that the US will lose in influence and prestige so long as Castro’s successful defiance of the US (including his acceptance of bloc assistance) continues, and that the US is faced with the dilemma of tolerating an increasingly Communist-oriented Cuba or of arousing widespread Latin American opposition by intervening.“

February 17, 1961, Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Cuba:

“Cuba will, of course, never present a direct military threat to the United States…

For the Communist powers, Cuba represents an opportunity of incalculable value. More importantly, the advent of Castro has provided the Communists with a friendly base for propaganda and agitation throughout the rest of Latin America and with a highly exploitable example of revolutionary achievement and successful defiance of the United States.“

April 27, 1961, Notes on the 479th Meeting of the National Security Council, Notes on Cuban Crisis:

“At this stage plans continue for all kinds of harassment to punish Castro for the humiliation he has brought to our door. However, the general feeling is that all this should be handled carefully, that there should not be too much publicity, that attitudes of others should be taken into account.“

May 2, 1961, Report Prepared by a Combined Working Group From the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State and the Office of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency, Facts, Estimates, and Projections:

“The threat posed by the Castro regime in Latin America stems from its inherent appeal to the forces of social unrest and anti-Americanism at a time when most of the area is in the throes of a fundamental transformation. Castro and the Communists have made assiduous efforts to capitalize on this situation. Cuba has become the center of a propaganda and subversion campaign of unprecedented proportions in Latin America. Both Castro and the Communists see the Cuban revolution not as an end in itself but as the prototype of a transformation which will eventually sweep over all of Latin America. Given the chaotic stage of Latin American politics pro-Castro elements have a significant capability for stirring up demonstrations and disorders in a number of countries, and in a few an outside chance of gaining power in the next few years.

…

The continued existence of the Castro regime would fundamentally alter the terms of Latin American relations with the US. US restraint would be interpreted by Latin American ruling groups as evidence of weakness.

Aside from its direct effect on US prestige the survival of Castro would profoundly affect Latin American political life. It would set the stage for political struggle in terms long promoted by Communist prop-aganda in the hemisphere, with the issue drawn between “popular” anti-US forces and the ruling groups allied with the US.“

May 4, 1961, Paper Prepared for the National Security Council by an Interagency Task Force on Cuba: Cuba and Communism in the Hemisphere:

“Castroʼs basic aim (supported by the Chinese and principally the Soviets) has been to capture indigenous social revolutionary movements for the communists, strengthen existing communist movements, and, by supporting these movements, weaken the fabric of constitutional government throughout the hemisphere.

To some extent he has been successful in identifying his regime with the cause of economic and social progress. And as he moves forward economically his example may become more attractive. He has provided a rallying point and a source of ideological support for communist movements everywhere; and often for left-wing nationalist movements. One of his principal objectives is to identify and unify the nationalist left and the communists. He has provided a working example of a communist state in the Americas, successfully defying the United States. Thus he has appealed to widespread anti-American feeling, a feeling often shared by non-communists. His survival, in the face of persistent U.S. efforts to unseat him, has unquestionably lowered the prestige of the United States and the presence of Castroist extremist elements are often an important obstacle to orderly social and economic reform“

May 9, 1961, Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Program of Covert Action Aimed at Weakening the Castro Regime:

“There appears to be general agreement that there is no sure way of overthrowing the Castro regime short of United States military intervention. There is a possibility, albeit slight, that lesser measures—covert and overt—might result in the overthrow of the Castro regime from within. However, as long as Castro thrives, his major threat—the example and stimulus of a working communist revolution—will persist“

March 21, 1962, National Intelligence Estimate, The Situation and Prospects in Cuba:

“The Castro-Communist threat in Latin America results from the ability of a well-organized subversive movement centered in Cuba to exploit the natural tendency of entrenched oligarchies to resist the growing demand for radical social reform. What is seen by radical revolutionary elements in Latin America is that, while others have talked of social reform, Fidel Castro has actually accomplished a radical social revolution in Cuba, and has done so in defiance of the Yankees with the support of an apparently more powerful patron. Relatively moderate reformist regimes are now ascendant in most Latin American countries, but, if the Alliance for Progress should fail to produce its intended social reforms in time to meet rising popular demands, the conviction will grow that Castroʼs way is the only way to get timely and positive results. Thus, despite Castroʼs alienation of the moderate reformists, there remains a danger that the Cuban example will set the pattern of the impending social revolution in Latin America.”

August 23, 1962, Memorandum of Meeting With President Kennedy, Cuba:

“After the meeting in a private conversation with Robert Kennedy, I stated that I felt Cuba was our most serious problem; [4 lines of source text not declassified]. I also added, in my opinion, Cuba was the key to all of Latin America; if Cuba succeeds, we can expect most of Latin America to fall.“

February 3, 1964 as quoted by Piero Gleijeses, Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976, (2003)

“Perhaps of even grater moment is that the primary danger we face in Castro is not what he does in the way of distributing arms, disseminating propaganda, training subversives, and dispatching agents, but in the impact the very existence of this regime has upon the leftist movement in many Latin American Countries.

The simple fact is that Castro represents a successful defiance of the US, a negation of our whole hemispheric policy of almost a century and a half. Until Castro did it, no Latin American could be sure of getting away with a communist-type revolution and a tie-in with the Soviet Union. As long as Castro endures, Communists in other Latin American countries can, to use Stalin’s words, ‘struggle with good heart’“

Thanks for reading,

Notes:

Piero Gleijeses quotes from the following reference: DOS, Policy Planning Council, “Caribbean: Cuba” (draft outline), Feb. 13, 1964, pp 13, 6-7, 8-9, 10, NSFCF, box 26